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I. Introduction 
 
       Any foreign manufacturer desiring to market its products in Jordan has several 
courses open to it. The foreign manufacturer could establish a branch or wholly-owned 
subsidiary in Jordan or enter into a licensing or joint venture agreement with a company 
doing business in Jordan. If it wants a less significant presence, however, it is left with 
the alternative of having a local commercial agent market and sells its products.        
       Commercial agency has taken an increasing share of domestic and international 
business. The number of agencies and percentage of total retail sales has grown rapidly, 
far outpacing economies as a whole.1 Agents play essential role in promoting the sale of 
their principal's products and performing a multiplicity of other functions for their 
principals, ranging from the procurement of visas and customs clearances to providing 
support and assistance in contract negotiations and local government relations. 
       The law of commercial agency in Jordan is statutory. Agency is subject to dual 
regulation; civil and commercial codes.2 A basic law also exists regulating agency legal 
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1 See Augustin Jausas, International Encyclopedia of Agency and Distribution Agreements 23-26 (2008) 
(agency contracts run to the tune of billions of dollars worldwide).  
2 The Arab legal system distinguishes between acts to which private persons are parties (civil acts) and acts 
to which merchants are parties (commercial acts). The former are generally subject to the civil code and the 
latter to the commercial code. The civil and commercial codes complement each other in many areas 
including agency relations. See H S Shaaban, Commercial Transactions in the Middle East: What Law 
Governs? 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 157, 160-163 (1999). See also See Mohamed El-Sayed El-Keky, 
Commercial Law 78 (in Arabic) (2004).    
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relationships; Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001.3 In 
addition, international developments at the World Trade Organization (WTO) impact the 
future of commercial agencies laws in Jordan.  
       Given the high financial commitment of agency investments, and the time duration 
of most agency agreements, it is not surprising that the legal issues surrounding 
exclusivity and termination are among the most controversial in agency law. Clauses 
governing exclusivity and termination are likely the most important provisions in the 
agreement, as they limit what an agent may do.  
       The purpose of this article is to study certain aspects-exclusivity and termination- of 
commercial agency according to the Jordanian law.4 The article is divided into four 
sections. Section two explains the general rules governing commercial agency in Jordan. 
Section three analyzes exclusivity of commercial agents. This section introduces the 
WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the basic instrument covering 
trade in services, and analyses the current commercial agencies regulation in Jordan and 
its relation to articles VIII and IX of GATS. Also, section two explores Jordan schedule 
of specific commitments under the GATS in order to shed light on the extent and limit of 
its obligations with regard to commercial agents. Section four discusses agency 
termination. Finally, the article concludes by summarizing the main issues discussed and 
provides recommendations to streamline agency law in Jordan.  
 
                                               
3 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, Official Gazette No. 4496 (July 16, 
2001).  
4 The article examines mainly the agency laws of Jordan. Reference to laws of other Arab countries will be 
made when necessary. The agency laws in the countries discussed share similar characteristics. For 
example, in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where private enterprise is encouraged, 
foreign suppliers must use agents in practically all instances. In general, these countries reserve agency 
activities to their own nationals. Agents are regulated by mandatory registration procedures, and they are 
protected against arbitrary termination by their foreign principals. See Sections II and IV infra.   
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II. What is an Agency? 
 
       The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001 defines a 
commercial agent broadly so that it covers commission agent, agent who distributes on 
his own behalf (distributor), and agent who distributes on behalf of a foreign company or 
a trader whose headquarter is located outside Jordan (commercial agent).5 Moreover, the 
Commercial Code defines commercial agency as an agency related to commercial acts 
involving an agent who carries out his duties in the name of his principal.6 The concepts 
of commercial agency and other intermediaries such as distributorship are not clearly 
distinguished in the Jordanian laws.7 As a result, regulators and practitioners alike may 
suffer from uncertainty about the exact kinds of commercial arrangements intended to be 
regulated as agencies.  
       The Jordanian law should define a commercial agency, in a straightforward manner, 
as an independent individual or juristic person who is contractually controlled by a 
principal and assigned to promote, sell, distribute products and provide services in the 
name and on behalf of the principal for remuneration.8 The distributor is an independent 
                                               
5 A commercial middleman is defined as any person who carries on the profession of mediation with a view 
to concluding or facilitating the inclusion of commercial dealings and transactions, in return for a fee 
provided that such a person is not an employee or a deputy of either one of the two parties to such 
commercial transactions. Id. art. 2. While Arab jurisdictions that regulate commercial agency share 
common definitional approaches, each jurisdiction has its own definitional subtleties and mix of exclusions 
and exemptions. See Egyptian Code of Commerce of 1999, art. 5; Kuwaiti Code of Commerce of 1980, art. 
271; Lebanese Commercial Code of 1942, art. 272; Moroccan Commercial Code of 1996, art. 393; Syrian 
Code of Commerce of 2007, art. 154; and UAE Commercial Transactions Law of 1993, 217.   
6 Acts defined as commercial in the commercial include purchase of goods intended to be sold as they are 
or after their manufacture, leasing of goods for lease, exchange operations, banking operations, land and 
maritime and air transport, brokerage and commission, insurance, public entertainment, and business 
agencies. Other commercial acts which are similar to these acts by nature or aim are considered commercial 
acts. See Jordanian Code of Commerce No. 12 of 1966, art. 6.1 & 2, 81.1.  
7 Commercial agencies and distributorships are essentially different and governed by different laws on 
Western legal systems. See Rochelle B. Spandorf, Franchise Player, 29 Los Angeles Lawyer 34, 43 (2006). 
See also Uri Benoliel,  Rethinking the Distributor-Manufacturer Fiduciary Relationship: A Marketing 
Channels Perspective, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 187, 215 (2008).  
8 A person is independent if he is essentially free to arrange his activity and determine his hours of work. It 
is important to point out the distinction between an independent agent and an employee. Any person who is 
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contractor who buys and resells for his own account and is normally free to fix his own 
resale prices.9 The distributor must generally pay the manufacturer regardless of whether 
or not he has been paid by his own customers. The distributor thus acts on his own behalf 
and assumes the risk of possible insolvency of the customers, which is not the case for 
the agent.10 In contrast with a distributor, a commercial agent does not own the goods and 
thus must render the proceeds of his sales to the principal.    
       Agents in Jordan are only subject to certain nationality and registration 
requirements.11 There is no age, experience in the agency's field of activity, or financial 
restrictions as requisites for registration. An individual agent should be a Jordanian 
national.12 A company, acting as an agent, must also be Jordanian.13 The Law of 
Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 does not set parameters for determining 
how a company could qualify as a Jordanian. Such parameters would have included 
majority of Jordanian ownership, having an office in Jordan, or majority of board of 
directors are of Jordanian nationality.  
                                                                                                                                            
regularly entrusted to solicit business for an entrepreneur or conclude business in his name is deemed an 
employee. Whether someone is independent turns on the factual circumstances of each case; merely having 
an agreement declare independence or non-employee status may not suffice. 
9 In the agency situation, the manufacturer retains an absolute control of the price at which his products will 
be sold in Jordan.  
10 In practice, however, the contrast between an agent and a distributor is often not so marked. This is the 
case, for example, where the manufacturer participates in or follows closely the activities of the distributor, 
or where, for a variety of reasons, the distributor's gross profit upon his resale of the goods is not more than 
the commission which a sales agent would normally receive on such a sale. This is also the case where the 
distributor is granted payment terms by the manufacturer which exceed those the distributor normally 
grants to his own customers. 
11 The laws of other Arab countries imposes financial and professionals qualifications for practicing 
agency. See Fredrick J. Taylor Jr. & Howard O. Weissman, Middle East Agency Law Survey: Legal 
Requirements for Commercial Agency Arrangements in the Middle East: A Survey of Algeria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates, 14 Int'l Law. 331 
(1980). 
12 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 3.    
13 Id. 
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       In addition to the nationality condition, a commercial agent must be duly registered 
at the Commercial Agents Registry of the Ministry of Industry and Trade.14 A person 
who desires to practice as a commercial agent must submit an application to the 
Registrar. The application contains personal information of the agent and the principal 
and a copy of the agency agreement.15 The agency agreement may include many 
provisions, but the most crucial which ought to be included are territory, products, 
exclusivity, commission rate, effective term, just cause for termination, compliance with 
law, and governing law and dispute resolution. 
       Of course, nothing prevents the Registrar from requesting further documents or 
information as he deems necessary. The Registrar will have to issue his decision 
regarding the application within two weeks.16 In the event of acceptance, a certificate will 
be issued by the Registrar after payment of the appropriate fees.17 The agent must quote 
his registration number on all correspondence and commercial transactions.18 Although 
not stated in the Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001, the agent ought 
to report any addition or amendment to the information required in the application for 
registration so as to keep the file up to date.  
       A commercial agent will be crossed off the Register in case of submitting incorrect 
information, termination of the agency agreement, or expiry of its term.19 Non-
                                               
14 Id. art. 5.  
15 Id. art. 6.a(1) & (2). See also Howard L. Stovall, 'Short Form' Agreements under Arab Commercial 
Agency Law: Some Legal and Practical Issues, ABA Middle East Law Committee Newsletter (September 
2016) (The commercial agency agreement must be drafted in Arabic or accompanied by an Arabic 
translation. Preparing this Arabic translation could be relatively costly if the parties commercial agency 
agreement is lengthy, and a local commercial agent would usually prefer to avoid incurring this translation 
cost).  
16 Id. art. 6.b.  
17 Id. art. 6.c.  
18 Id. art. 7.  
19 Id. art. 9.  
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registration results in a fine.20 Non-registration does not invalidate an unregistered 
commercial agent. Thus, a failure to register will not prevent a commercial agent from 
practicing as such. A commercial agent must be duly registered in order to qualify for the 
protection and enjoy the privileges of the law.21 An agent will not be entitled to any 
indemnity upon termination if the agent is not duly registered with the commercial 
registrar at the time his contract is terminated by the principal. However, even if an agent 
were not so registered when he entered into the agency agreement and he so represented 
in the contract, he could probably under certain circumstances register after the signing of 
the sales agency contract, thus defeating any representation or undertaking not to register 
which he might have made in the sales agency contract.  
       An agent must have a direct relationship or link with his principal.22 The direct 
relationship requirement is enforced through the registration process and the law does not 
grant any exceptions or discretion in this regard. The direct relationship requirement is 
intended to prohibit the use of sub-agents. Without the direct relationship requirement, a 
commercial agent would become sub-agent of foreign parties intervening between him 
and the producers or manufacturer. This type of intervention, if permitted, would defeat 
the requirement that the agent must be a Jordanian national. Another reason that may 
justify the requirement of direct relationship is to maintain prices of products low for 
consumers. Interference of many intermediaries could increase costs of production. 
However, taking into consideration the continuous exorbitant prices of products in 
                                               
20 Id. art. 18.a(3).  
21 Id. art. 10.a. 
22 The commercial agency laws of Egypt, Kuwait, Syria, and UAE have similar requirement of direct 
relationship. See Thomas F. Clasen, International Agency and Distribution Agreements: Middle 
East/Africa/Asia/Pacific 25-31 (1994).   
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Jordan, as well as in other Arab countries, makes this reasoning a mere illusion.23 Prices 
are inflated anyway and generally increased by commissions paid to hidden middlemen 
and brokers. The reasonable justification for the rule of direct relationship is to maintain 
the requirement of nationality and make commercial agency a closed circuit.   
       The importation of most products is allowed by both private and public entities.         
Jordan only restricts the use of agents in armaments contracts. The law prohibits anyone 
acting as an agent from buying, importing, or selling arms, spare parts and ammunition.24 
The importation of armament and defense equipments must be channeled through 
government departments. 
       The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 does not address in 
details rights and obligations of parties to an agency contract. The Law of Commercial 
Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 states, in one article only, that an agent is under an 
obligation to keep sufficient quantities of spare parts for the products and offer facilities 
for after-sale services.25 The bulk of the parties’ rights and obligations are found in the 
Commercial and Civil Codes. The parties cannot modify these rights and obligations by 
agreement. 
                                               
23 See Taking the Strain; Food Prices and Protest, The Economist (May 10, 2008) (As a result of food 
inflation, millions of people are being pushed into hunger and malnutrition—and 30-odd countries face 
social upheaval unless food policy improved. In the Middle East, the part of the world most dependent on 
food imports, there have been demonstrations and strikes in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan. But all three 
countries withstood more serious food riots in the late 1970s and 1980s. Some countries in the Middle East, 
such as Syria, have so far survived demonstrations by issuing ration cards or hiking wages).  
24 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 12. The laws of 
many countries restrict or prohibit the use of commercial agents in military sales. See Roger S. Goldman, 
Have I Got a Deal for You: Use of Commissioned Agents in Foreign Military Sales, Int'l Q. 51, 63-68 
(1990).   
25 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 11. 
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       The primary duty for an agent is to carry out the authority granted to him by the 
principal.26 In carrying out his authority, the agent must act with the care of an ordinary 
person.27 An agent receives the funds of his principal as a trustee.28 As such, the agent the 
liable if the funds are lost due to his negligence. The products must be sold at a price 
fixed by the principal.29 Hence, an agent is not free to sell the products at a lower price or 
any other price. The agent, as part of the agency contract, must report to the principal the 
agency’s activities and other information regarding its performance.30 The purpose of this 
reporting is to keep the principal abreast of the affairs of the agency and to act 
accordingly, if necessary.      
       As a commercial agent has certain duties, the principal is also bound by certain 
duties. For example, the principal is under an obligation to remunerate the agent.31        
The Jordanian law does not specify any remuneration ceilings. The agent's remuneration 
could be based on a percentage of the value of the contract obtained through the agent. 
Moreover, the law does not specify if the commercial agent has a right to remuneration 
for the business concluded which is to be attributed to his activity. In some cases, an 
agent may have the right to remuneration without having conducted any attributable 
activity. If, for instance, an agent is assigned an exclusive sales area or a defined group of 
customers, he has the right to claim remuneration for all contracts concluded with persons 
within the scope of the area or with the designated customers, even though he did not 
actually participate in the transaction. The law does not determine when the remuneration 
                                               
26 An agent may exceed the authority granted by the principal is the outcome is beneficial to the latter. See 
Jordanian Civil Code No. 43 of 1976, art. 840.  
27 Id. art. 841.  
28 Id. art. 846. See also Jordanian Commercial Code, art. 84.   
29 See Jordanian Civil Code, supra note 26, art. 852.  
30 Id. art. 856. 
31 Id. art. 857. 
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is due. It could be due upon the completion of the supplier's performance of the 
transaction. Unless otherwise provided by contract, the principal could account for 
remunerations on a monthly basis. 
       The principal is bound by the agent’s actions.32 However, the agent is jointly and 
severally liable with the principal to the local merchant for whose benefit a contract has 
been concluded until all the terms and conditions of the contract have been performed.33 
Finally, the principal is liable for any damages caused to the agent through the ordinary 
performance of the agency.34 The principal is not liable if the damage is caused by the 
agent’s own negligence.   
       Courts in Jordan have exclusive jurisdiction in settling disputes arising out of 
commercial agency contracts.35 A foreign court cannot decide such disputes. Moreover, 
the use of arbitration is not permitted.36 The wording of the law means that the parties do 
not have the choice to use arbitration even after a dispute has risen. The exclusive 
jurisdiction of Jordanian courts is thus mandatory and leaves no room for using other 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. There is no obvious reason as to why the law 
grants courts the exclusive jurisdiction in settling commercial agency disputes without 
any exceptions. The exclusive jurisdiction of Jordanian courts could be intended to 
protect local agents by not using foreign courts which they are not familiar with. 
       The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 provides that after a 
certain length of time, three years post contract termination or term expiry, claims arising 
                                               
32 Id. art. 859.  
33 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 15.   
34 See Jordanian Civil Code, supra note 26, art. 859. 
35 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 16.a.    
36 In general, arbitration can be used to settle all civil and commercial disputes. See Omar Aljazy, 
Arbitration in Jordan: From Old to New, 25 Journal of International Arbitration 219, 223 (2008)  
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out of agency contracts will not be heard.37 This rule is founded upon considerations of 
public policy. Documents may be lost, witnesses may be dead, and the recollection of 
events long past may have become dim. Passage of time extinguishes the legal right of 
enforcement; it does not extinguish the underlying obligation.38 Parties cannot contract 
out by denying the lapse of a period of time. Courts would invalidate such a provision on 
the grounds that it contravenes public policy.   
       Agency law violations carry several penalties. Parties who "willfully" submit false 
information to the Registrar pertaining to agency registration or who falsely represent 
themselves as agents are subject to a fine of between Jordanian Dinar 500 (equivalent to 
US $706) and Jordanian Dinar 2000 (equivalent to US $2827).39 The inadvertent agent 
who had no intention to violate the law cannot be punished. Foreigners who engage in 
commercial agency activities in contravention of the law are subject to up a fine.40 
Violators of armaments contracts prohibition are subject to severe penalties. These 
violators can be sentenced between six months and one year, and/or fined between 
Jordanian Dinar 10000 (equivalent to US $14,139) and Jordanian Dinar 15000 
(equivalent to US $20,208), and recovering any remuneration received or profits made, if 
known, or any amount at the discretion of the court if the remuneration is unknown.41 
Injured individuals may have private remedies-such as compensatory damages, 
restitution, or lawyer's fees- for agency law violations. The Law of Commercial Agents 
                                               
37 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 16.b.  
38 Jurisprudence of Arab countries allow an action to enforce a claim of right to be barred by the passage of 
time. However, the Sharia does not recognize the legal notion of passage of time as extinguishing any right. 
This distinction between a legal right and its enforcement, which is cogent, has greatly influenced the laws 
of Arab countries. See Mahir Jalili, Time Bar Clauses in Saudi Arabian Contracts, 13 International 
Construction Law Review 488, 490-91 (1996). 
39 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 18.a. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. art. 18.b. 
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and Intermediaries of 2001 does not provide several other penalties such as blacklisting, 
freezing of assets and confiscation, ordering restitution, issuing cease and desist orders, 
banning violators from registration.  
III. Exclusivity of Commercial Agency 
 
       Exclusivity exists when a manufacturer utilizes only one agent for the sale of his 
products. The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 and related laws do 
not regulate the exclusivity clause. In contrast to some legal systems mainly in the Gulf 
States-Kuwait and UAE- the Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries does not set 
out the basic elements which a contract of commercial agency must contain.42 Rather, the 
Jordanian legislator left the exclusivity provision to the agreement of the parties. In other 
words, exclusivity is determined by general principals of contract and is a matter of 
negotiation between a foreign principal and its Jordanian commercial agent. In practice, 
all commercial agents are Jordanian nationals and enjoy exclusive privileges.  
       The first inquiry into exclusivity involves the express language of the agency 
agreement between the parties. Agency can be de facto exclusive without an express 
agreement between manufacturer and agent.  
       A manufacturer can simply appoint an agent in a particular geographic area and 
refrain from appointing any other. To put it differently, a manufacturer may impose 
territorial limitations upon the agent which confine an agent's sales within an assigned 
geographic area. For example, a cheese manufacturer might expressly prohibit each agent 
from selling cheese outside its assigned territory. This type of restriction can be referred 
                                               
42 See Kuwaiti Code of Commerce, art. 274. 
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to as an "exclusive territory" as it results in a closed territory.43 A manufacturer can agree 
that the agent will sell the manufacturer's product only within a specified territory. This 
arrangement, which can be referred to as creating an "exclusive sales territory," limits the 
agent's freedom to deal with other manufacturers. In other words, the agent is not free to 
sell the goods of other manufacturers in the designated areas. A manufacturer may also 
forbid its agents to sell to certain designated customers or customer classes.44 These types 
of agency restraints involve the allocation of customers or classes of customers among 
agents on the basis of characteristics other than geographic location. The manufacturer 
may reserve certain accounts to certain agent because, among other things, it is more 
qualified to serve the special needs of those customers. In addition, the manufacturer may 
assign a class of customers to some, but not all, agents so as to permit agent 
specialization.  
       The question is whether the manufacturer, having granted the agent territorial 
exclusivity, thereafter lawfully may engage in market expansion conduct designed to 
increase the manufacturer's market penetration within the territory already provided to the 
manufacturer's agent. Agents fearing encroachment of their established and well-
developed territories could respond by filing lawsuits against the manufacturer. The 
encroachment of the manufacturer violates his contractual obligations to the dealer.  
A. The Law and Economics of Competitive Market 
       Competition is the linchpin of the free market system. A market is considered 
competitive if individual firms in that market have little or no power to influence the 
                                               
43 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private 
Business: A "Trade Law Approach" for Linking Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO, 72 Chi.-Kent 
L. Rev. 545, 550 (1996).  
44 The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001 does not address customer restraints. 
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price or other terms on which products are sold.45 By ensuring that resources are 
allocated efficiently and by spurring innovation, competitive markets ultimately 
maximize consumer welfare. 
       The relationship between competition and commercial agency is particularly relevant 
to so-called "vertical restraints".46 Vertical restraints frequently involve manufacturers 
and distributors. Vertical restraints typically relate to the geographic territories or classes 
of customers to which distributors sell, the degree of exclusivity the manufacturer or the 
distributor can count on from the other, and the prices at which distributors sell. The 
negative anti-competitive effects of exclusivity can be considerable.  
       Exclusivity of commercial agency can be a restraint of trade or monopolization.47 
Exclusivity can raise barriers to entry or market access and thus enhance unilateral price-
raising power. The loss of business resulting from exclusivity could lead to claims of 
anti-monopoly violations by excluded parties.48 An exclusive agency can eliminate 
rivalry among agents in the sale of the manufacturer's product and has the potential of 
                                               
45 See Michal S. Gal, Imported Antitrust Competition Policy for Small Market Economies 35 (2003). See 
also Michal S. Gal, Market Conditions under the Magnifying Glass: The Effects of Market Size on Optimal 
Competition Policy, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 303, 314 (2002).      
46 See Jessica L. Taralson, What Would Sherman Do? Overturning the Per Se Illegality of Minimum 
Vertical Price Restraints under the Sherman Act in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. V. PSKS, Inc. 
was not as Reasonable as it Semmed, 31 Hamline L. Rev. 549, 556 (2008). See Barbara Ann White, Black 
and White Thinking in the Gray Areas of Antitrust: The Dismantling of Vertical Restraints Regulation, 60 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1991). See also Val D. Ricks and R. Chet Loftis, Seeing the Diagonal Clearly: 
Telling Vertical From Horizontal in Antitrust Law, 28 U. Tol. L. Rev. 151, 159 (1996).   
47 See Lahouel, Competition Laws in MENA: An Assessment of the Status Quo and the Relevance of a 
WTO Agreement, 6-7 (The Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey: Cairo 
2000). For an examination of the competing view of antitrust law see Page, Ideological Conflict and the 
Origins of Antitrust Policy, 86 Tulane L. Rev. 1 (1991).  
48 In principle, Jordan competition law covers the entire economy; yet it provides several important 
exemptions. For example, competition law does not apply if other legal provisions do not allow 
competition in a market for certain goods or services. Such provisions take precedence over the provisions 
of the competition law. See Jordan Provisional Anti-Trust Law No. 49 of 2002, Official Gazette No. 
(4560), art. 7 (August 15, 2002). 
 14 
permitting the authorized agent himself to exercise some market power.49 However, the 
manufacturer's or agent's purpose could be not to limit rivalry in itself or to permit an 
agent to exercise market power but rather to render more efficient the distribution of his 
product. The manufacturer would not grant the exclusive agency unless he believed it 
would make the distribution of his product more efficient. Exclusivity can be lawful in 
the absence of monopolistic purpose or anticompetitive effect i.e. the maintenance of a 
minimum pricing. That exclusive agency is lawful remains to be tested in courts.50 
Therefore, the legality of exclusive agency, under anti-monopoly laws, remains intact. 
       National authorities in Jordan systematically favor the interests of domestic 
commercial agents over the interests of domestic consumers. For example, customs 
authorities will prevent the entry into Jordan of goods originating with a foreign 
manufacturer who has a duly registered agent for these goods in Jordan, but are shipped 
through another person. Jordanian courts can issue an injunction to prevent parallel 
import made by a third party in breach of the exclusivity clause. Parallel imports involve 
the importation of genuine goods outside the authorized distribution channels.51 In other 
words, parallel import is the importation of goods from a foreign source by bypassing the 
authorized local agent therefore allowing the sale of goods directly to retailers or 
consumers. The matter of parallel importation is addressed through case law as the 
following case illustrates.    
                                               
49 The Kuwaiti Antitrust Law, for example, prohibits abusive use of a dominant position. See Lahouel, 
supra note 44, 8. See also El-Dean, Privatisation and the Creation of a Market-based Legal System: The 
Case of Egypt 167 (Egypt competition law forbids exploitative behavior) (Brill Academics: Leiden 2002). 
50 No case to our knowledge has addressed the question of legality of exclusivity.  
51 Parallel imports or gray market goods are genuine goods and not counterfeits whereby trademark is 
misappropriated. See Keith E. Maskus, Parallel Import, 23 World Econ. 1269 (2000). 
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       The case concerns a Jordanian company, Jordan Mechanical Engineering Company, 
acting as an agent of “Maggi” chicken stock cubes which is a product of Nestle, a Swiss 
company.52 It came to the knowledge of Jordan Mechanical that some Jordanian traders, 
such as Abdul-Fattah Qinno, imported about 1000 box of Maggi cubes (product of 
Egypt). These products did not conform to the required specifications. The Court of 
Cassation found that Jordan Mechanical was entitled to preserve its rights as the 
authorized agent of the manufacturing company for marketing certain goods.    
       By bringing the case, discussed above, the agent sought to protect regular trade 
channels. Local agents have built the goodwill of imported products by marketing plan, 
promotional efforts, and providing a product warranty through after-sale servicing. The 
purpose of all these programs is to maintain clients and increase the sale of goods. Agents 
provide services and incur costs that parallel importers may not provide or incur. Thus, 
parallel importers free ride at the expense of authorized distributors. In addition, parallel 
imports may damage product quality control. Poor quality could cause consumer 
confusion and diminish the reputation of the manufacturer and agent.  
B. The General Agreement on Trade in Services 
       The basic WTO instrument regulating trade in services is GATS, introduced as 
Annex 1B to the Agreement Establishing the WTO of April 15, 1994.53 GATS 
establishes the basic structure for regulating trade in services by adopting a framework 
similar to that for trade in goods under the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
                                               
52 See Court of Cassation, Journal of Jordanian Bar Association, Case No. 95/1418, page 957 (1996). 
53 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr.15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 28 (1994), 33 
I.L.M. 1167 (1994). 
 16 
(GATT).54 Articles XVII and II of GATS respectively establish the National Treatment 
and Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) principles, subject to rather substantial rights of 
derogation under each country's Schedule of Specific Commitments and List of MFN 
Exemptions, respectively drawn up in line with further stipulations in Article XX of the 
GATS and the GATS Annex on Article II (MFN) Exemptions. Article XVI establishes a 
market access obligation somewhat akin to the provision on quantitative restrictions in 
Article XI of the GATT, which obligation is also subject to derogations under the 
Schedule of Specific Commitments. Despite these basic disciplines, the GATS is very 
much an agreement in continuous progress. In several aspects, GATS is no more than an 
agreement to enter into further negotiations with reference to progressive liberalization to 
further liberalize trade in services.55 This makes GATS, in several respects, a difficult 
agreement to enforce, since several of the provisions end up in effect as expressions of 
intent to liberalize despite their not being worded as such.  
       GATS requires the member country to ensure that a monopoly supplier does not 
"abuse" its monopoly position when it competes in the supply of services outside its 
monopoly rights.56 This language applies only when there is a "sole" supplier of the 
service in question. GATS provides that member country recognizes that certain business 
practices of service providers, other than those falling under article VIII, may restrain 
competition and thereby restrict trade in services.57 Obviously, this provision leaves a 
great deal of discretion to countries as to the definition of these restraints on competition, 
                                               
54 See Aly K. Abu-Akeel, Definition of Trade in Services under the GATS: Legal Implications, 32 GW J. 
Int'l L. & Econ. 189, 190 (1999) (GATS speaks to trade in services through certain supply modes: cross-
border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons. The peculiar 
characteristics of trade in services require that any international instrument for their regulation depart, in 
certain key respects, from the concepts and rules incorporated in the GATT).  
55 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 53, art. XIX. 
56 Id. art. VIII. GATS left the important term "abuse" undefined. 
57 Id. art. IX.1. 
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the regimes applying to them, and the measures available to oppose them. Furthermore, 
GATS obliges the member to accede to any request for consultation with any other 
Member concerning eliminating restrictive business practices with a view to eliminating 
them.58 GATS also imposes a duty to cooperate in the provision of non-confidential 
information of relevance to the matter in question. GATS Article VIII violations are 
subject to, under the Article XXIII, the Dispute Settlement and Enforcement provisions 
which authorize a complaining member to resort to the WTO's Dispute Settlement 
Understanding procedures.  To date, there have been several requests for consultations 
concerning GATS article VIII.59 Those requests represent a good example of the potential 
for competition to be used for further liberalization in trade in services and to address 
market access barriers.  
       Article VI of the GATS deals with domestic regulation. At its most basic level, it 
provides that in sectors where specific commitments are undertaken, each Member shall 
ensure that all measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered 
in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner. GATS sets out specific rules to apply to 
measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, and 
licensing requirements to ensure that they do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade 
in services.60 Such measures in domestic regulations should not constitute unnecessary 
barriers to trade in services.       
                                               
58 Id. art. IX.2. 
59 See Catherine B. Harrington, Weather May Not Stop USPS, but Special Interests Will: The Bush 
Administration's GATS Offer Supports Private Express Delivery Services but Threatens to Stamp Out 
USPS, 19 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 431, 448-459 (2003) (providing references to Deutsche Post case, Canada 
Post's activities, and U.S. Postal Service).  
60 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 53, at art. VI.4. 
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       Beyond this, the negotiating technique adopted in drawing up the GATS is unique. 
Unlike the GATT, which involves a negative list approach under which any item or 
sector not included in a schedule is deemed to be automatically covered by the 
agreement, the GATS involves a positive list approach, under which only those items 
specifically scheduled by a contracting party are covered. The latter approach is 
inherently more restrictive, since only those commitments and sectors which the parties 
have expressly considered are covered. This approach excludes, for example, newly-
emerged services that parties could not anticipate at the time of negotiations. 
C. Jordan's Specific Commitments in Relation to Commercial Agency 
       Jordan made specific commitments in specific service sectors on both market 
access-Article XVI of GATS- and national treatment-Article XVII of GATS.61 These 
specific commitments are inscribed in a schedule with such limitations and derogations as 
Jordan deemed necessary. These specific commitments effectively form the crux of the 
obligations currently undertaken by Jordan under the GATS, since they determine the 
incidence of the wider, more general disciplines under the agreement. 
       The sector of distribution services- whereby Jordan made many commitments- 
includes postal, energy, land transportation, maritime, environmental, audiovisual, and 
tourism services. However, since my goal is not to analyze this sector thoroughly in the 
present article, at this stage I will discuss Jordan's commitments as they relate to 
commercial agency only.  
                                               
61 In addition to specific commitments, Jordan adopted a general commitment that may not be undermined 
or modified by it to recognize most-favored nation status (MFN status). The general commitment applies 
horizontally to all sectors and to all countries. Id. art. II.1 (With respect to any measure covered by this 
Agreement[GATS], each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service 
suppliers of any other country).  
 19 
       With regard to commercial agency, Jordan submitted a rather limited schedule of 
commitments. Jordan introduced several limitations on market access. Barriers to market 
access include exclusive rights for "Jordanians" to supply; restrictions on the legal entity 
through which a service supplier may deliver the service (e.g., natural persons and 
partnerships); and limitations on the level of shareholding or equity that a foreign service 
supplier may make.62 Jordan also made no commitments for "presence of natural 
persons" mode of supply so that it could introduce or maintain measures inconsistent with 
market access or national treatment.  
       The commitments made by Jordan with regard to commercial agency can be 
evaluated as trade barriers operated intentionally to protect the exclusivity rights for 
Jordanian agents. However, these commitments may reflect the particular cultural-social 
environment in Jordan which would support their incorporation, the necessity of 
sustaining specific public policy objectives, or the inevitable reflection of the particular 
situation intrinsic to Jordan. At any rate, based on the commitment Jordan made in the 
WTO, commercial agency seems to be particularly ripe for the consideration of 
competition policy and for further liberalization.  
IV. Termination of Commercial Agency 
 
       Agent effectiveness within his assigned market area is critical to a manufacturer's 
plans. Ineffective agents can lead to lost sales and ultimately taking the manufacturer out 
of the market. As such, the principal or manufacturer can terminate the existing agency 
relationship. The termination clause is one of the most important clauses in any agency 
agreement. The elements of the clause involve: mutual termination rights without cause; 
                                               
62 See Sector Specific Commitments of Jordan-Distribution Services, available at  
<http://tsdb.wto.org/simplesearch.aspx> (last accessed August 26, 2010).  
 20 
a definite term; termination for cause; and the delineation of the parties' rights and 
obligations upon termination and thereafter.    
       The simplest form of termination is bilateral termination right whereby the agency 
agreement is terminable by both parties.63 Thus, one party cannot terminate a valid 
agency contract without the agreement of other party. While unilateral termination is 
generally accepted for ordinary contracts,64 the Law of Commercial Agents and 
Intermediaries of 2001 does not permit this type of termination.65  
       Moreover, it is common for a commercial agency to contain a specific term.66 
Agency terminates at the end of its specific term. In this case, the commercial agent is not 
entitled to compensation. The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 
provides that the termination of an agency agreement without any fault on the part of the 
agent allows him to claim compensation.67 The rule seems to apply only to termination of 
an agency before its expiry term. Thus, termination of an agency agreement due to its 
expiration does not entitle the agent to compensation. In commercial agency for fixed 
term, the agreement, not the law, may provide for serving a notice. It is possible that an 
agency agreement does not contain a provision for termination. In this scenario, the 
length of the contract will be set at a reasonable duration. 
                                               
63 See Jordanian Civil Code No. 43 of 1976, art. 241, 242. See Court of Cassation, Journal of Jordanian Bar 
Association, Case No. 1870/96, page 4620 (1997).  
64 See Jordanian Civil Code No. 43 of 1976, art. 176. 
65 In contract with Jordan, the commercial agency laws of other countries permit unilateral termination by 
either party at any time and compensation is due only if the termination takes place without prior notice or 
in an untimely manner. See Egyptian Code of Commerce of 1999, art. 163; UAE Commercial Transactions 
Law of 1993, 214.  
66 The term of the agency agreement is simply one of the terms bargained for. 
67 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 14. See also 
Howard L. Stovall,  Recent Changes to Commercial Agency and Distributorship Law in the Middle East, 
Texas Transnational Law Quarterly (September 2008) (The UAE Commercial Agency Law states that if 
the commercial agency is terminated “at an inappropriate time” or for any reason beyond the commercial 
agent’s control, the commercial agent may claim compensation for damages suffered). 
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       An agent may sue the principal/manufacturer for termination without cause or fault 
on the part of the agent and may recover any damages relating to the termination and his 
lost profits.68 Causes for termination may include fraud or breach of contract. These 
causes are considered significant transgressions committed by the agent that merit 
termination. The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 does not 
provide standards for "cause or fault."69 The presence of these standards is designed to 
prevent principals or manufacturers from engaging in opportunistic behavior when the 
relationship between the principal and the agent sour. In addition, these standards compel 
principals to treat their agent fairly. The law should have provided that termination can 
only occur upon a failure to perform substantially on material aspects of the contract. The 
law also should have provided an opportunity for the agent to correct the problem before 
resorting termination. In other words, termination of an agency agreement should be the 
last resort. The law does not address the issue of burden of proof of cause for termination 
and whether the burden falls upon the principal or the agent.   
       To protect the principal against an agent's under-performance, the agency agreement 
ought to include a performance evaluation provision which should be linked to a 
termination. Such an evaluation provision may include sales performance trends over 
                                               
68 Id. Like Jordan, other Arab countries afford agents a high degree of protection against termination and 
non-renewal of agency agreements. See Egyptian Code of Commerce of 1999, art. 163; Lebanese Code of 
Commerce, art. 289; Syrian Code of Commerce, art. 384; and UAE Commercial Transactions Law of 1993, 
art. 214. See also Theodore W. Kassinger and Dylan J. Williams, Commercial Law Reform Issues in the 
Reconstruction of Iraq, 33 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 217, 222 (2004).  
69 Every contract imposes an obligation of good faith and fair dealing on contracting parties. This rule can 
be relevant in defining termination. See Chibli Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between 
Classical Transactions and Modern Business, Am. J. Comp. L. 81, 104-110 (2001). See also Frederick V. 
Perry, Shari'ah, Islamic Law and Arab Business Ethics, 22 Conn. J. Int'l L. 357, 374 (2007).   
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time.70 In this way, a manufacturer can reasonably justify the termination of the agency 
within for those commercial agents who fail to perform effectively. 
       In the event of wrongful termination, the Jordanian courts decide the amount of 
indemnity owed to the agent, taking into account the harm actually suffered by the agent 
and lost profits.71 In practice, however, the indemnity is frequently determined arbitrarily 
by the courts on the basis of an annual commission arrived at by averaging the 
commissions of the preceding years of activity.72 A court is likely to take into account as 
well factors other than the amount of past commissions, such as showroom costs, 
warehouse, maintenance or repair facility, the amount of money which the agent has 
invested, the portion of the agent's time which has been devoted to the principal's 
business, or the cost to the agent of the termination of employment and other contracts 
resulting from the termination of the sales agency relationship. To recover this indemnity, 
the agent must demonstrate that he has not breached the agency agreement, and that he 
has successfully promoted the principal's products.73 The overlapping provisions of the 
Civil Code and the Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 may increase 
the sum awarded in case of termination. The right to an indemnity cannot be waived by 
contract. In other words, this right to an indemnity exists notwithstanding any contractual 
provision to the contrary. 
                                               
70 Jordanian courts must walk a fine line in interpreting the evaluation provision. For example, the fact that 
sales for a given year are less than those of the previous year "without being ridiculously low" is not 
sufficient to deprive the agent of a termination indemnity. Also, in a case where mandatory sales goals are 
provided, courts should refuse to permit termination of an agency agreement for failure to comply with the 
sales goals, on the ground that such failure do not result from a lack of activity on the part of the agent but 
from the fact the products are becoming less popular with the potential customers. 
71 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, supra note 3, art. 14. 
72 See Court of Cassation, Journal of Jordanian Bar Association, Case No. 88/148, page 1355 (1990). See 
Court of Cassation, Journal of Jordanian Bar Association, Case No. 88/235, page 1379 (1990). 
73 See Court of Cassation, Journal of Jordanian Bar Association, Case No. 95/515, page 2885 (1997). 
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       Termination can occur by the operation of the law. For example, the death or insanity 
of the commercial agent terminates the relationship by operation of law.74 However, 
death or insanity of the supplier does not automatically terminate the agency. The agency 
relationship, unless otherwise agreed, will be deemed effective until the successor of the 
supplier gives different instructions. Bankruptcy of the principal terminates the agency 
relationship by operation of law.75 Bankruptcy of the commercial agent does not 
terminate the agency relationship automatically, but constitutes a reason for the principal 
to terminate the contract. If the principal does not choose to terminate the relationship, 
the trustee in bankruptcy may do so on behalf of the agent.  
Conclusion 
 
       A successful relationship between the foreign principal and his local agent must be 
based on familiarity with the laws of Jordan. The Civil and Commercial Codes as well as 
the Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 govern agency relationships 
in Jordan. Many of these codes and laws overlap leading sometimes to confusion. For 
instance, parties’ rights and obligations are found in the Commercial Code, Civil Code, 
and Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries. The Jordanian legislator should enact 
a comprehensive commercial agency law that governs all aspects of agency.     
       The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries gives commercial agency a 
sweeping scope. The law does not distinguish between agencies and other intermediaries. 
Consequently, a broad variety of unsuspecting commercial arrangements may qualify as 
agencies. The Jordanian law should provide a clear definition for each type of 
intermediaries.  
                                               
74 See Jordanian Civil Code No. 43 of 1976, art. 861. 
75 Id. art. 205.  
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       The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries does not regulate exclusivity. 
Rather, the Jordanian legislator left the exclusivity provision to the agreement of the 
parties. Rational use of exclusive agency may affect competition and consumer welfare. 
Anti-monopoly enforcement agencies should not elevate the short-term pecuniary 
interests of discrete competitors at the expense of competition and consumer welfare. 
That exclusive agency is lawful remains to be tested in courts. If a case arises in the 
future, courts should uphold exclusive agency. When the decision to grant an exclusive 
agency is made by manufacturer acting in its own self interest, consumer welfare could 
be protected to a greater extent than any ad hoc decision-making by a court could secure. 
A subsidiary rationale for sanctioning exclusive agency is the common sense notion that 
courts should not provide artificial, non-market incentives for internal expansion, an 
alternative to exclusive agency that will be inefficiently pursued if appointments of 
exclusive agents are met with expense and protracted challenges under the anti-monopoly 
laws.  
       Jordanian courts have exclusive jurisdiction in settling disputes arising out of 
commercial agency contracts. The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries does 
not permit the use of other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration 
and mediation. Litigation flies in the face of maintaining healthy relations between the 
principal and agent. The principal and agent must continuously cultivate good personal 
relationships. These types of mechanisms help mitigate the spillover effects of disputes 
between principals and agents especially if they are engaged in long-term relationships. 
Therefore, the law should be amended so as to permit the use of such mechanisms.         
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       On balance, Jordan's approach to the use of commercial agents is restrictive. The law 
sets certain conditions for a person to act as an agent. For instance, these conditions relate 
to nationality and registrations. Only Jordanian persons can become agents for foreign 
principals or manufacturers. In addition to the nationality condition, a commercial agent 
must be duly registered at the Commercial Agents Registry of the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade. The purpose of registration, among other things, is to keep record of persons 
acting as agents. As currently written, the law does not invalidate an unregistered 
commercial agent who can practice agency. The law should be modified to invalidate 
unregistered commercial agents so as to protect consumers and other third parties whom 
may deal with the agent.   
       In discussing exclusivity of commercial agency, Law of Commercial Agents and 
WTO rules are closely related and interact with each other. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the GATS, through articles VIII and IX, places an obligation on the part of WTO 
members not to introduce more restrictive rules on the flow of services and preserve the 
degree of access provided under current domestic regulations. Jordan maintains 
restrictions in the distribution sector, including commercial agency, in which foreign 
investment is circumscribed through equity and other restrictions. Trade partners may 
pressure the Jordanian government to adopt the policy of increasing competition in 
commercial agency as a basic principle of regulatory reform. Moreover, GATS can be a 
promising tool for achieving liberalization in commercial agency sector. Thus, any future 
modification to the commercial agency law will not be a voluntary response by the 
government to internal public and private sector concerns who prefer to maintain the 
status quo.  
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       The termination clause is one of the most important clauses in any agency 
agreement. The agency agreement can terminate by the mutual desire of parties, at a 
definite time, or for a good cause. A manufacturer cannot terminate the agency at any 
time, for any reason or for no reason at all. An agent may sue the manufacturer for 
termination without cause or fault on the part of the agent and may recover any damages 
relating to the termination and his lost profits. The "cause" standard for termination is 
vague and variable because clear patterns of acceptable or proscribed conduct are 
difficult to discern. The law, or even courts through judicial decisions, should provide a 
bright- line standard for termination. It is also advisable that a reason be given for the 
termination so as to avoid a claim that the termination is malicious. In addition, a notice 
of termination, with a "cure" provision should be included in the law. In other words, the 
law should provide a notice of termination so that the agent and principal can settle their 
accounts and avoid surprise termination. Even before termination, the law could grant the 
agent a grace period to rectify the problem that would merit termination.  
       Many lawsuits are the product of the parties' failure to honestly or sufficiently 
communicate their expectations of each other during the course of their agency 
relationship. As far as the contract is concerned, the structure of a commercial agency 
agreement varies considerably, depending on the legal drafting technique. A well-written 
contract, combined both with honest communication by the manufacturer and solid 
justifications for its business conduct, are big steps toward avoiding the filing of a lawsuit 
to begin with. Beneficial relationships will result from a combination of frequent and 
timely communications between the principal and his agent and also from knowledge of 
the laws of Jordan related to commercial agency. If still more reforms do prove 
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necessary, the presently suggested improvements will give future legislatures the 
background for serious consideration and understanding of what, in fact, remains to be 
done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
